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RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONAL CRITIQUES 
OF LAWYERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Scott L. Cummings* 
INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether lawyers help or hurt social movements has been 
hotly debated by legal scholars for nearly half a century.  As progressive 
social movements began to decline in the 1970s, scholars developed a 
powerful critical account of the role that lawyers had played, stressing how 
lawyer domination and overinvestment in legal tactics had worked against 
sustainable grassroots activism.  Despite significant changes in politics and 
the profession since the civil rights period, these foundational critiques of 
progressive lawyering have persisted, fostering profound skepticism about 
what lawyers can do “for and to” social movements.1 
This Article argues that the current moment invites reconsideration of 
these critiques.  The rise of new social movements—from marriage equality 
to Black Lives Matter to the recent mobilization against President Trump’s 
immigration order—and the response of a new generation of movement 
lawyers eager to lend support has refocused attention on the appropriate 
role that lawyers should play in advancing progressive social change.  
Rather than fall back on familiar critical themes, the time is ripe for 
developing a new affirmative vision. 
This Article seeks to reappraise the foundational critiques of progressive 
lawyers from the perspective of comparative institutional analysis.  This 
analysis locates lawyers within a broader field of social activism in which 
nonlegal actors confront their own set of challenges in advancing 
movement goals:  such as struggles over leadership, debates over the 
desirability of gradual versus radical change, and the constant threat of 
reversal and backlash.  Legal scholars, focusing on what they know best 
(lawyers and courts), have not investigated the challenges to social 
movement activism within this broader field, which is the subject of a 
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 1. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social 
Movements:  An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1 (Austin Sarat 
& Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). 
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significant scholarly literature in social science.  Drawing on insights from 
social science research, this Article asks how evaluation of lawyers in social 
movements might change if the same analytical tools that have been used to 
spotlight the limits of lawyers and legal advocacy were also applied to 
nonlegal actors and strategies.  What would we learn by comparing the 
challenges social movements face outside of law to those faced by lawyers 
mobilizing inside the legal system?  This Article’s central claim is that 
expanding the frame of critical analysis to highlight the parallel challenges 
that nonlawyers face in advancing social change outside of court weakens 
the power of critical accounts specific to lawyers.  In short, reframing the 
way we think of social movements can rehabilitate the way we think about 
lawyers’ contributions to them. 
I.  LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  
TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
More than a half century ago, the NAACP’s seminal victory in Brown v. 
Board of Education2 ignited intense debate—in the academy and in the 
streets—over the appropriate role of lawyers in the struggle for social 
change.3  With America on the cusp of political upheaval that would 
transform understandings of the relation between law, social movements, 
and state power, the question of whether lawyers promoted or impeded 
reform went to the core of the democratic projects championed by civil 
rights and other progressive movements of the time.  The answers 
formulated in the wake of Brown, as these projects began to decline, have 
framed subsequent discussions of lawyering for social change around two 
foundational critiques.  The first is one of lawyer accountability, claiming 
that lawyers advancing rights on behalf of marginalized constituencies risk 
letting their own ideological commitments undercut the interests of those 
they serve.4  The second is one of legal efficacy, claiming that court-
centered legal strategies are ineffective at best, unable to change social 
practice on the ground, and detrimental at worst, causing social movement 
demobilization and backlash while legitimizing the status quo.5  Taken 
 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. For a classic account, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959). 
 4. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471–72 (1976); William H. 
Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights:  The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal 
Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 163–64 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 338–39 (1991) (concluding that courts almost never effect social change); 
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:  LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE 91, 214 (2d ed. Univ. of Mich. Press 2007) (1974) (arguing that lawyers pursuing 
rights generated “support for the political system by legitimating the existing order” and 
promoting “one-on-one conflicts within the framework of the adversary system”); Alan 
David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:  A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1051–52 (1978) 
(arguing that U.S. Supreme Court decisions legitimize the status quo rather than promote 
change); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations:  The Backlash Thesis, 
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together, these critiques have anchored a descriptive account of civil rights 
history that associates overinvestment in law reform—the classical strategy 
of “legal liberalism”6—with the decline of the very progressive movements 
that Brown helped to spark.7  And they have supported a normative account 
of social change lawyering in which lawyers play a circumscribed role, 
deemphasizing courts and deferring to clients in the quest to build power 
from the bottom up.8 
The recent explosion of scholarly interest among legal academics in 
social movements has occurred against the backdrop of these foundational 
critiques.  On one side is a conversation about lawyers and lawyering, 
which has played out in the academic fields of the legal profession and 
clinical law, drawing upon insights from legal mobilization theory.9  Here, 
recent research has focused on demonstrating how contemporary lawyers, 
unlike their legal liberal predecessors, do not rush to court seeking national 
policy change for underrepresented groups.  To the contrary, lawyers in the 
contemporary literature follow the lead of social movement organizations 
and coordinate law with politics in efforts to achieve campaign objectives.10  
Empirically, this literature stresses that lawyers are not blinkered by the 
“myth of rights” in ways that undermine movement activism.11  
Prescriptively, the literature suggests that lawyers should represent 
movements in client-centered terms, using law to ensure that “the 
movement takes the lead.”12 
This conversation has been largely disconnected from scholarship within 
constitutional law but has important resonances with it.  Like the lawyering 
literature, its main focus is on the role of social movements as crucial 
democratic actors.  Decentering the U.S. Supreme Court, scholars have 
drawn attention to the role of social movements producing constitutional 
law from the bottom up by opening space for new constitutional orders to 
emerge and channeling movement claims into pressure for judicial 
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Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 
115 YALE L.J. 256, 263–64 (2005). 
 7. GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE:  HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND 
KILLS POLITICS 123–24, 127 (2009) (discussing the backlash against Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973)). 
 8. See Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:  Learning Lessons of 
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2146 (1991). 
 9. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:  PAY EQUITY REFORM AND 
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). 
 10. Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist:  Community Campaigns, Law, 
and Social Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133, 2144 (2007). 
 11. See, e.g., Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Law and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1879, 1919–20 (2007). 
 12. Kathleen M. Erskine & Judy Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead:  The Role 
of Lawyers in the Struggle for a Living Wage in Santa Monica, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 249, 257–58. 
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recognition.13  This happens by movements asserting new norms through 
direct action, changing public opinion, and using their power to reshape 
political processes to support new judicial appointments.14  Scholars in this 
literature make the empirical claim that once social movements have shifted 
culture and transformed politics, Supreme Court decisions change to 
validate the new consensus social movements have produced.15  The 
normative implication is that the Court should lag behind culture, which 
intersects with the lawyering literature in that both place social movements 
out ahead of legal change.  To the extent that courts do not heed this 
warning, they risk a backlash that undermines the causes they purport to 
advance.16 
Both of these literatures present powerful and deeply optimistic accounts 
of the transformative potential of grassroots mobilization, appropriately 
supported by law and legal institutions.  Yet, in so doing, they reproduce a 
version of the foundational critiques within the new social movement 
scholarship:  promoting lawyer deference to social movement clients to 
enhance accountability and promoting judicial deference to social 
movement political activism to enhance efficacy.  In the professional 
literature, lawyers are skilled technicians—“hired guns”—for movements.17  
In the constitutional literature, they are deemphasized as agents of reform.  
Because legal change occurs through bottom-up norm generation, culture 
shifting, and judicial appointment making, the role of lawyers is limited to 
the formalistic one of filing the case (so a court may validate the principles 
that movements have already enacted).  The takeaway from both literatures 
is that lawyers should stand behind movements, supporting them when 
necessary, but not get too far out front. 
Implicit in this portrait of lawyers is a crucial counterfactual:  that putting 
movements first will in fact yield more accountable and effective challenges 
to power.  All too often, this counterfactual is presumed rather than proven.  
It is nearly always the case that in analyzing a campaign for systemic 
reform, one can find errors in judgment, flaws in execution, or 
disappointing results.  However, in judging the impact of lawyer strategic 
decisions on a given campaign, the relevant question is whether lawyers 
and legal advocacy do a better or worse job than the available alternatives.  
Answering that question with precision is impossible because one can never 
know how events would have unfolded if lawyers had not been involved.  
Even if it is possible to dissect and critique legal strategy and outcomes 
with twenty-twenty hindsight, it is never possible to know if the problems 
 
 13. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:  Identity-Based Social 
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001). 
 14. See Jack Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the 
Constitution:  The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK L. REV. 27, 28–30 (2005). 
 15. See id. at 30; see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2595 (2003) (discussing the empirical connection between public opinion and 
judicial outcomes). 
 16. See generally Klarman, supra note 5. 
 17. See, e.g., Erskine & Marblestone, supra note 12, at 258–59. 
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identified were a product of the unique limitations of law and legal 
strategists. 
This is where comparative institutional analysis may helpfully reframe 
the discussion.  While the new social movement literature reprises familiar 
critical themes, it also provides an opportunity to revisit and potentially 
move beyond the critical account of progressive lawyers.18  It does so by 
paving the way for incorporation of parallel social science discussions of 
accountability and efficacy that permit comparison of lawyers and legal 
action to their social movement counterparts.  This comparative 
institutional perspective addresses the limits of existing theoretical 
accounts, which have overstated the role of lawyers and court-centered 
advocacy and understated the role of nonlawyer leaders and nonlegal 
strategies—and the challenges the latter face in social movements.  By 
explicitly theorizing the opportunities for and constraints on alternatives to 
law, a comparative institutional perspective reveals how the foundational 
critiques of lawyers may be better understood as specific versions of more 
general criticisms of social change actors and strategies. 
II.  REFRAMING THE FOUNDATIONAL CRITIQUES 
This part suggests how a comparative institutional perspective helps to 
reframe the foundational critiques in ways that soften their negative edge, 
revealing lawyers as less suspect allies in challenges to power.  In each 
case, reframing works by incorporating insights across the existing law-
social science disciplinary divide.  Incorporating a more complex 
understanding of social movements as comprised of independent 
organizational actors with their own representational contests reframes the 
accountability critique as a problem of leaders, not just lawyers.  This 
changes the analytical approach by comparing the risks of alternative 
representational structures (inside and outside of the lawyer-client 
relationship) and the benefits of coordination between lawyers and 
nonlawyers in potentially reducing conflicts.  The project therefore becomes 
identifying and evaluating the conditions under which movement leadership 
is most likely to be accountable. 
Similarly, incorporating a more nuanced view of how lawyers become 
involved in movements and the viability of alternative courses of political 
action reframes the efficacy debate as a problem of politics, not just law.  
This changes the analytical approach to court impact and backlash by 
comparing the tradeoffs of available political alternatives while also 
considering the benefits of coordinated legal and political strategies.  The 
project then becomes identifying and evaluating the conditions under which 
outsider challenges (legal and political) are most likely to succeed in 
changing rules, promoting implementation, avoiding backlash, and shifting 
power. 
 
 18. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism:  Critical Legal Consciousness 
and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 940–41 (2007). 
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At bottom, using a comparative institutional perspective facilitates the 
same basic analytical move:  comparing lawyers and legal action to their 
social movement counterparts.  Doing so helps to deepen the evaluation of 
the role of lawyers in social movements by focusing on their relative 
accountability and relative efficacy.  This comparative institutional 
framework repositions criticisms of lawyers and lawyering as specific 
versions of more general criticisms of social change actors and strategies.  
Understanding this specificity permits a finer-grained judgment of 
accountability and efficacy because the relative comparison group changes:  
if all social change actors and actions confront some version of the same 
problems, then the question becomes whether lawyers and legal strategies 
do a better or worse job than viable alternatives—and under what 
conditions. 
A.  Relative Accountability:  
What Is Special About Lawyers? 
This section explores the concept of relative accountability by engaging 
with two critical interventions about the lawyer’s role in social movements:  
Derrick Bell’s famous indictment of civil rights lawyers for “serving two 
masters” in the pursuit of school integration,19 and Lani Guinier and Gerald 
Torres’s more recent work on “demosprudence” as a movement-oriented 
model of progressive lawyering that also contains a critical perspective on 
its legal liberal counterpart.20  In both cases, the basic method is to reframe 
each discussion in a comparative institutional framework by reference to 
insights from social science about parallel accountability problems in social 
movement activism.  The goal is to shift the terms of each discussion away 
from lawyers per se to more generalized problems of social movement 
mobilization:  in Bell’s account, focusing on the problem of organizational 
professionalization (rather than professionalism) and in Guinier and 
Torres’s account, focusing on the problem of elite representation (rather 
than legal representation). 
1.  Professionalization 
The critical view of lawyers as a threat to collective action rests on 
concerns about the nature of the professional relationship in social 
movement contexts where mechanisms for promoting lawyer accountability 
to clients and broader constituencies are said to be weak.21  Derrick Bell’s 
famous critique of NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) 
lawyers resonated so powerfully within the legal academy precisely because 
it sounded in terms of professionalism and legal ethics.  By arguing that 
LDF lawyers were either disregarding or minimizing the voices of African 
American parents who wanted quality schools, not just integration, Bell 
 
 19. See generally Bell, Jr., supra note 4. 
 20. See generally Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind:  Notes Toward a 
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014). 
 21. See Simon, supra note 4, at 162. 
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located the dispute squarely within the core principles of zealous 
advocacy.22  The metaphor “serving two masters” underscored the idea that 
client interests were being sacrificed:  both to funder priorities and to the 
LDF attorneys’ own assessment of the appropriate educational goal.23  
Bell’s argument hinged on a sympathetic reading of Justice John Marshall 
Harlan II’s dissent in NAACP v. Button,24 in which he stressed that LDF 
lawyer’s “divided allegiance” could “prevent full compliance with his basic 
professional obligations.”25  Bell went further, suggesting that LDF lawyers 
were violating the spirit of the professional code, if not its letter, by 
allowing “the influence of attorney and organization” to create conflicts 
with the interests of class members who were diffuse, uninformed, and 
divided.26 
Bell’s critique framed the lawyer’s role in social movements by isolating 
the problem of conflicting loyalties in the class action context and situating 
that problem within a familiar professional discussion.  Although Bell’s 
critique trenchantly spotlighted the fundamental problem of accountability 
in cause lawyering, it distorted the issue by treating it in isolation from the 
broader social movement context and suggesting that the problem and 
solution could be understood through analysis of the ethical rules.27  
However, the mere fact of a potential formal ethical violation begged the 
most important professional and political questions.  Formal rules of 
professional responsibility, as the conduct of southern states in response to 
NAACP enforcement activity underscored, could be manipulated by 
opponents to undermine legitimate legal activity.28  More significantly, 
litigation that raised formal conflict questions could still be socially 
valuable if more people within the affected constituency benefitted overall 
relative to alternatives in which subgroups pursued conflicting goals or did 
nothing.29 
From a comparative institutional perspective, the deeper question raised 
by Bell’s analysis is which type of agency relationship between movement 
leaders and their constituency is most likely to produce accountability in a 
particular context.  Bell’s fundamental claim—that idealistic leaders funded 
by well-resourced actors outside of the main constituency may act in ways 
that diverge from the interests of a significant portion of the constituency 
they purport to represent—is generalizable.  The questions are then twofold.  
First, in a particular social movement context, is there something about 
lawyers and their legal organizations that poses unique representational 
risks?  And, second, is there something about nonlegal social movement 
organizations that makes them better suited to the representational task? 
 
 22. See Bell, Jr., supra note 4, at 504. 
 23. Id. at 489–93. 
 24. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 25. Bell, Jr., supra note 4, at 499. 
 26. Id. at 504. 
 27. See id. at 512. 
 28. Button, 371 U.S. at 419–26. 
 29. See William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 
481 (1984). 
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Critics of lawyers and legal organizations in social movements make two 
types of arguments.  First, they suggest that there may be something 
inherent in the nature of the lawyer-client relationship that makes it 
incompatible with strong lawyer accountability to constituency ends.  In 
this account, lawyers either represent individual clients, whose ability to 
monitor lawyer activity is inherently restricted (and particularly so when the 
clients are vulnerable), or the lawyers represent groups through devices like 
the class action, which are unaccountable because named plaintiffs often 
have “no significant individual stake, and as a result, no incentive to 
monitor.”30  Professional rules emphasizing lawyer independence and 
confidentiality are said to increase the risks to accountability by inhibiting 
monitoring by organizations outside the lawyer-client relationship that may 
have greater power and sophistication and thus would be better positioned 
to ensure that lawyers serve constituency interests.31  The second critical 
argument is that by virtue of their legal expertise, lawyers are in a position 
to turn to the legal system to advance their own version of a constituency’s 
best interests (Luban’s “problem of democracy”), sometimes against the 
views of other movement leaders.32  In Bell’s famous words, “Idealism, 
though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to control.”33 
But is such idealism any easier to hold accountable when it is enacted by 
nonlawyers?  Movements, as aggregations of loosely connected 
organizational and individual actors, always speak through leaders, who 
often voice conflicting views.34  Monitoring problems and agency costs are 
also classic problems within social movement organizations (SMOs), 
though they may operate in different ways.  The “iron law of oligarchy,”35 
that SMOs tend to be dominated by elites over time and preoccupied with 
concerns of organizational maintenance,36 suggests that SMOs may 
confront similar pressures that put stress on constituent accountability.  
From a formal ethics perspective, it is true that third parties are not 
permitted to control lawyers or have access to specific types of client 
information.37  However, there are often other monitoring mechanisms 
available, particularly in dense organizational fields where political 
relationships create pressures on lawyers to conform to goals expressed 
through other types of leadership structures.  Moreover, in some contexts, 
 
 30. Simon, supra note 4, at 163. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 341–43 (1988). 
 33. Bell, Jr., supra note 4, at 504. 
 34. See DAVID S. MEYER, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST:  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA 
71–74 (2007) (discussing the organizational complexity of social movements and the 
potential for conflict and cooperation). 
 35. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY (1911). 
 36. See FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS:  HOW 
THEY SUCCEED, WHY THEY FAIL, at xxii (1977). 
 37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (stating the 
basic confidentiality duty); id. r. 1.7(a)(2) (stating that a conflict exists when there is a 
“significant risk” that legal representation of a client will be “materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to . . . a third person”). 
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lawyers may perform essential tasks articulating a unifying movement 
platform and overcoming internal community divisions. 
Mark Tushnet’s account of LDF’s drive to Brown makes this point 
explicitly.  In reflecting on the inherently political solution to the problem 
of conflicting interests in movement representation, Tushnet notes:  “Both 
Houston and Marshall had enormous ability at the essential, and 
fundamentally political, task of coordinating the conflicting interests of the 
various constituencies that the NAACP’s litigation had to satisfy.”38  As 
Tushnet’s analysis suggests, from a comparative institutional perspective, 
accountability must be judged based on a contextual view of the broader 
movement field, which includes both non-movement lawyers asserting 
dissenting legal claims as well as other political actors to whom movement 
lawyers must ultimately answer.  Lawyers can, given the porousness of the 
legal system, go off on their own in ways that are inconsistent with 
movement aims.  But it is also possible for nonlawyer activists to garner 
attention and financial support for positions at odds with broader movement 
views.39 
With respect to funding conflicts, which Bell stresses in his analysis of 
LDF, a key insight of resource mobilization theory in sociology is that 
SMOs that rely on external funders who are not direct movement 
beneficiaries are “likely to have high levels of tension and conflict.”40  
While mobilizing external resources is necessary to overcome the free rider 
problem and build organization, it also embeds the problem of external 
control as part of the SMO’s basic architecture.41  As social movement 
scholars have shown, when SMOs become more professionalized and 
dependent on sustained patronage from philanthropic groups, the problem 
of leader ideological and funder conflicts deepens—just as they do in legal 
groups.42  Accountability, from this comparative perspective, is related to 
organizational professionalization, not legal professionalism as such.43 
Viewing this issue through a comparative institutional lens does not 
negate the critique of lawyer accountability but contextualizes it in helpful 
ways by taking the concept of “representation” outside of the narrow 
confines of professionalism.  This perspective decouples the issue of 
representation from the professional framework, where it has been too 
cabined by traditional associations with legal ethics, which have 
 
 38. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 157 (1987). 
 39. See generally BRYAN BURROUGH, DAYS OF RAGE:  AMERICA’S RADICAL 
UNDERGROUND, THE FBI, AND THE FORGOTTEN AGE OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE (2015) 
(documenting the rise of radical leftist groups in the 1970s, including the Weather 
Underground, Black Liberation Army, and Symbionese Liberation Army). 
 40. John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:  
A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1216–31 (1977). 
 41. See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK 
INSURGENCY, 1930–1970, at 45 (1982). 
 42. J. Craig Jenkins & Craig M. Eckert, Channeling Black Insurgency:  Elite Patronage 
and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black 
Movement, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 812, 827 (1986). 
 43. See id. 
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overdetermined critiques by pointing to discrepancies between lawyer 
actions and the contested interests of their constituencies.  Comparative 
institutional analysis enables a relative evaluation of different models of 
constituent representation, which interact and compete in the messy real 
world of social movement conflict, while revealing how nonlegal 
movement representatives confront analogous accountability problems as 
they mobilize dissent outside of law. 
2.  Elites 
From a comparative institutional perspective, evaluating lawyer 
accountability to movements requires appraisal of alternative structures of 
representation and how well they advance constituent interests.  Challenges 
to the adequacy of representation in social movements are often couched in 
terms of political arguments wielded by one faction of a movement against 
another.  For example, Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s history of civil rights efforts 
in Atlanta after Brown reveals conflict between the NAACP as an older, 
more elitist, and incrementalist political organization and the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as a younger, more radical, 
and more politically confrontational group.44  This conflict played out in 
terms of lawyering style with NAACP lawyers like A.T. Walden committed 
to “biracial negotiation and piecemeal civil rights litigation,”45 while 
lawyers for SNCC, particularly Lou Holt, engaged in a “crusade to marry 
litigation and direct action.”46  But the conflict went beyond models of 
lawyering, as each group represented different constituencies (the 
established black elite versus students) and adopted different approaches to 
political mobilization (negotiation versus protest), reflecting distinctive 
social change visions that lawyers were enlisted to advance. 
The complex nature of accountability in social movements and the 
challenge of evaluating lawyer interventions is highlighted in Guinier and 
Torres’s important work on demosprudence, in which they posit an 
affirmative role for lawyers in collaborating with movements to promote 
sustained democratic change.47  In a key example, Guinier and Torres focus 
on the role of lawyers in relation to the Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party (MFDP).48  The MFDP, led by grassroots leaders including famed 
activist Fannie Lou Hamer, sought to be seated at the 1964 Democratic 
National Convention as the “official Mississippi delegates,” in place of the 
all-white Democratic Party delegation, which had excluded blacks from the 
franchise.49  In Guinier and Torres’s story, the northern elite white lawyer, 
Joe Rauh, who represented the MFDP, is portrayed in unfavorable terms as 
 
 44. TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT:  ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 195 (2011). 
 45. Id. at 199. 
 46. Id. at 194. 
 47. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 20, at 2743 (“The role played by legal 
professionals . . . is essential.”). 
 48. Id. at 2762. 
 49. Id. 
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a legal liberal insider whose quest for a pragmatic resolution to the high-
stakes standoff at the convention—a “behind the scenes” compromise in 
which the MFDP would take two seats at the convention rather than its 
sought-after full delegation status—undercut the radical potential of the 
MFDP’s position.50  Rauh, in this view, “did not grasp” the MFDP’s 
fundamental goal, which was to “organize, to develop the power of the local 
people to change their own circumstances,”51 and ultimately to promote 
participation and secure “freedom,” not simply “a convention seat for two 
‘representatives.’”52  And Rauh did not pursue the appropriate means to 
achieve this goal, failing to appreciate that the MFDP’s “challenge to state 
power came from outside the precincts of normal politics,” instead 
channeling that challenge into “conventional deal-making.”53 
What seems clear from Guinier and Torres’s account is that Rauh had 
multiple conflicts of interests in representing the MFDP:  he was a delegate 
from D.C. and “beholden to national unions” as legal counsel to the 
powerful United Auto Workers, whose president, Walter Reuther, was part 
of the team attempting to negotiate a compromise (along with leaders from 
the Johnson administration and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, represented by Martin Luther King Jr.).54  However, it is not 
clear how much Rauh mishandled his charge, which was to gain the MFDP 
“shared seats with the regulars,”55 or what precisely turned on his 
representational conflicts as opposed to the conflicts among the civil rights 
movement leadership convened to find a solution to the MFDP challenge.  
The MFDP was not “the movement” but rather an important organizational 
component of it, which had retained Rauh precisely because his insider 
status gave him credibility in the convention process.56  In that process, 
movement leaders, including King, were already trying to negotiate a 
solution.  With President Johnson intent on holding the Southern 
Democratic Party together in the face of threatened defections if the MFDP 
was seated in full, compromise appeared inevitable.57 
In Guinier and Torres’s story, Rauh sought to negotiate a legalistic 
solution, rather than appreciating that the goal of representation “was not 
the same as ‘freedom.’”58  But it is not clear that the ultimate problem was 
legal representational conflict as opposed to intramovement political 
conflict.  Rauh’s participation in the negotiations on its own seemed 
appropriate, even essential, to representing his client’s interests.  Perhaps it 
was true that Rauh failed to bargain hard enough, did not adequately 
express the degree to which the MFDP viewed the fight as having “a right 
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side and a wrong side,”59 or expressed support for a two seat compromise 
he knew would be unacceptable to his client.  However, those failures have 
to be weighed against what was possible and how Rauh understood his 
duty. 
In this regard, it seems arguable from the account that Rauh did his best 
in the face of a classic organizational conflict:  Who spoke for the MFDP?  
Its leadership, which seemed to support the compromise?  The majority?  
Or the subgroup led by Fannie Lou Hamer?  If it was the executive officers, 
then Rauh’s belief that “he could not vote for the proposal, nor could he 
endorse the compromise within the party chiefs, without the approval and 
support of” the officers seems like a plausible representational position, 
consistent with organizational ethical rules.60  From this point of view, 
Guinier and Torres’s critique that Rauh “did not have the consent of the 
entire MFDP delegation” is apt but not decisive.61  Moreover, the MFDP 
ultimately rejected the compromise and walked away from the 
convention,62 a position the group would have likely ended up with even if 
Rauh had not played a brokering role given the background political 
maneuvering to push compromise. 
Folded into the story of Rauh’s lawyering, the MFDP example draws 
attention to the critical role of elites in social movement governance and 
how they affect the legitimacy of representation.  A central premise of 
movement lawyering is that following the dictates of movement leadership 
renders legal representation more accountable to nonelites than the 
conventional civil rights model, in which lawyers’ pursuit of elite interests 
was viewed as undermining the goals of constituent members, as Bell’s 
critique of the NAACP LDF underscored.63  Guinier and Torres make a 
similar claim by distinguishing authentic movement organizations from 
“interest groups,” viewed as part of conventional politics and therefore less 
responsive to nonelite constituencies.64  However, it may be practically 
difficult to distinguish movement organizations from interest groups in 
ways that give lawyers clear guidance about authenticity.  Although an 
orientation toward institutionalized politics and ties to external funding may 
be general characteristics of interest groups,65 the line between such groups 
and SMOs is often too blurry to serve as a general proxy for distinguishing 
elite and nonelite representation. 
Ultimately, in charged debates among movement organizational leaders, 
schisms are unavoidable and tend to occur along mainstream/radical and 
elite/nonelite lines.  Lawyers make representational choices in the context 
of these splits and, as William Eskridge has pointed out, may generally be 
inclined toward mainstream and elite positions by virtue of their training 
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and status.66  However, it is important to underscore that the problem of 
elite influence is not a problem of lawyering per se but rather a problem of 
political representation embedded in social movements that then shapes 
lawyer choices about client selection and tactics. 
In the MFDP example, the failure of elite leadership seemed as important 
as the failure of legal representation in thwarting the MFDP’s bid to be 
seated at the convention.  Indeed, Guinier and Torres’s insight that “[t]he 
dominance of elite thought reveals a tension in the ways even the most 
sympathetic elites ‘represent’ non-elites at the moment of action” seems 
like the most central point.67  This tension is revealed in the exchange 
between the MFDP delegates and Martin Luther King Jr., in which King 
stated:  “So, being a Negro leader, I want you to take this [compromise], but 
if I were a Mississippi Negro, I would vote against it.”68  As this suggests, 
King was in a similar representational position to Rauh.69  With both the 
lawyer Rauh and the nonlawyer King, it was the eliteness of their political 
position and their willingness to accept compromise that ultimately shape 
Guinier and Torres’s assessment.  “By attempting to serve two masters, 
King sought to preserve his own status as an individual power broker,” in 
contrast to Fannie Lou Hamer who tried “to hold [power-holders] 
accountable to a larger vision of justice.”70  This suggests that the 
fundamental accountability problem was not one of legal representation per 
se but elite representation more broadly.71  In the end, it was the refusal of 
elites to support the MFDP’s most ambitious goals that contributed to their 
failure. 
Critics of lawyer accountability are right to point out the ways in which 
lawyer conflicts affect group representation, but they less frequently 
compare lawyer conflicts to those faced by nonlawyer movement leaders.  
Yet, as the MFDP example illustrates, nonlawyer leaders must navigate 
their own conflicts among various movement interests.72  Although it is fair 
to presume that grassroots movement leadership structures, run by members 
of the affected constituencies, will generally be more accountable than 
lawyers (especially when the lawyers are outsiders), that presumption might 
not hold in all cases and would need to be tested on its own terms in 
specific contexts.  Along these lines, scholars like Tushnet have argued that 
NAACP lawyers, at least in the early phase of the desegregation campaign, 
helped to create well-developed accountability structures and were 
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answerable to other movement stakeholders.73  In contrast, accounts of 
grassroots heroes, such as Cesar Chavez, portray examples of 
authoritarianism and peremptory decision making at odds with the 
principles of participatory democracy they espoused.74 
B.  Relative Efficacy:  As Opposed to What? 
The question of whether law is an effective means to produce social 
change has focused primarily on the value of litigation and court-centered 
reform in contemporary social movements.  Although much of the 
scholarship has concentrated on the evaluation of court decisions 
themselves, legal efficacy also shines the spotlight on the decision making 
of lawyers in relation to the question of whether to pursue legal change 
through court.75  Specifically, empirical claims about the weak enforcement 
powers of courts have supported the critical argument that lawyer 
investment in achieving policy-shifting court decisions may constitute a 
misallocation of movement resources.76  Similarly, empirical claims that 
aggressive court decisions changing policy may push society too fast too 
soon have been used to suggest that lawyers defer litigation until society is 
ready in order to avoid backlash.77  These claims form an interlocking 
critical analysis in which court action is disfavored for either achieving too 
little (weak enforcement) or too much (backlash).  Implicit in this critical 
analysis is the notion that better routes to reform exist through social 
movement mobilization in politics and legislative policy change, which 
would leverage stronger tools at the legislature’s disposal to produce better 
implementation on the ground and avoid backlash by achieving greater 
cultural acceptance.  It is this counterfactual that requires deeper 
interrogation. 
This section explores the idea of relative efficacy through analysis of two 
seminal scholarly positions on court-based reform:  Gerald Rosenberg’s 
famous empirical analysis of the Supreme Court as a “hollow hope” for 
progressive reformers, particularly his analysis of the failure of Brown to 
produce meaningful desegregation in the South, and Michael Klarman’s 
“backlash thesis,” which he applied to Brown and then extended to the pre-
Obergefell marriage equality movement.  Again, in each case, the goal is 
not to prove either argument wrong on their own terms but rather to surface 
and engage with the implicit counterfactual embedded in each analysis:  
that there were viable and more effective nonlegal routes to the 
achievement of movement goals.  The aim is to shift the frame of critical 
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analysis away from the specific limits of court-centered reform toward the 
more generalized social movement challenges of policy implementation 
(not just court enforcement) in the face of local resistance and of 
countermobilization (not just backlash) in the face of social movement 
success. 
1.  Implementation 
A major concern about legal reform strategies is that they rely on an 
institution—the courts—with weak enforcement powers and, as a result, 
end up overinvesting in efforts that are unlikely to produce good results.  
This criticism builds on the legacy of court impact studies in political 
science and rests on a premise of institutional specialization:  because 
courts announce but do not enforce law, they are ill positioned to be agents 
of social change.78  The comparative institutional perspective presented 
here spotlights the fact that all decisions requiring affirmative governmental 
action—whether issued by courts, promulgated by agencies, or enacted by 
legislatures—have the potential for noncompliance and thus all raise the 
possibility of a gap between law on the books and law in action.  The 
voluminous social science literature on implementation makes precisely this 
point,79 which is directly relevant to the ex ante strategic question of 
whether legal change should be pursued through court or other institutions. 
In general, scholars have treated the impact of court decisions on social 
reform in isolation from consideration of how such decisions fare relative to 
viable alternatives.80  Critics of reform litigation might be able to prove the 
absence of a correlation between a court decision and an implemented rule, 
but that gap is politically significant to the extent that the decision to pursue 
legal change through the court displaced a nonlegal strategy that was more 
efficacious.  Put differently, if political mobilization also might result in a 
gap between a legislative rule and its implementation, the strategic decision 
of whether to pursue law or politics requires a relative assessment of 
enforcement alternatives.  From this wider perspective, court enforcement is 
seen as part of the more general problem of policy implementation.  
Comparative institutional analysis provides a way to assess this general 
problem by drawing attention to empirical evidence of implementation 
challenges outside of courts and also making connections to stories of 
movement decline after legislative, rather than judicial, victories. 
The lack of comparative institutional analysis of the enforcement 
problem reflects underlying disciplinary fault lines.  Legal scholars 
interested in enforcement have gravitated toward political science studies of 
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courts, which have developed along a separate track than research on policy 
implementation.  Political scientists in the two decades after Brown 
produced an impressive body of “court impact” studies, the central result of 
which was to repeatedly show that court decisions generally, and Supreme 
Court decisions in particular, failed to translate into robust social change on 
the ground.81  In this line of research, scholars found that desegregation 
plans often resulted in little actual desegregation,82 court decisions barring 
mandatory religious instruction were widely disregarded,83 and the Warren 
Court’s revolution in criminal procedure produced laws to protect suspect 
rights that received only partial respect from law enforcement officials.84  
Although these and other studies used various methodologies,85 they were 
united in the general conclusion that law on the books systemically 
diverged from the law in action—revealing the “banality of 
noncompliance.”86 
Coming out of the court impact tradition, Gerald Rosenberg, in his 
influential book The Hollow Hope, offered what would be the apotheosis of 
court impact studies of the civil rights era.87  The project was impressive in 
its scope and ambition, which was to determine “whether, and under what 
conditions, courts produce significant social reform.”88  To do so, 
Rosenberg went beyond scholars before him in two ways.  First, he 
developed a sophisticated theoretical model of the “Constrained Court,” 
which presumed that “courts will generally not be effective producers of 
significant social reform for three reasons:  the limited nature of 
constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence, and the judiciary’s 
inability to develop appropriate policies and its lack of powers of 
implementation.”89 Second, Rosenberg amassed a formidable amount of 
empirical data to investigate the relationship between court decisions and 
social change across the iconic issue areas of legal liberalism:  civil rights 
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(particularly Brown)90 and women’s rights (particularly Roe),91 as well as 
the environment,92 voting,93 and criminal procedure.94  On the basis of this 
sweeping analysis, he offered his famous conclusion:  “U.S. courts can 
almost never be effective producers of significant social reform.”95 
Rosenberg’s controversial analysis of Brown, concluding that the 
decision produced no meaningful desegregation and instead of generating 
public support provoked political backlash, received the most attention.96  
With respect to the direct effect of Brown on segregation, measured by the 
percentage of black children enrolled with whites in the South, Rosenberg 
argued that the opinion itself produced no meaningful change in the decade 
after Brown.  In addition, he argued that it was only with the arrival of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, which threatened to cut off federal funding for 
segregated schools, that there was significant desegregation.97  The lesson 
was that while legislation worked to produce integration, the judicial 
decision did not. 
However, while it was true that more rapid desegregation occurred after 
1964, there are confounding variables and later countertrends that cloud the 
picture.  First, the Court explicitly delayed enforcement in its famous 
remedial order counseling “all deliberate speed.”98  It was not until the 
Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Green v. School Board of New Kent 
County99 that it fully committed itself to wiping out segregation “root and 
branch.”100  A study by the UCLA Civil Rights Project found that legal 
enforcement affected the rate and scope of desegregation, which peaked in 
1988 due in part to focused resources devoted by the federal Department of 
Justice to enforcement efforts; decline occurred as a result of “a strong legal 
attack on desegregation orders, led by the Reagan and Bush 
administrations’ Justice Departments and, in 1991, the Supreme Court 
authorized the termination of desegregation plans.”101  Second, over time, 
despite short-term improvement, residential resegregation and legal failures 
to extend the scope of desegregation orders beyond jurisdictional 
boundaries caused school segregation to revert to the same level it was in 
 
 90. Id. at 42. 
 91. Id. at 175. 
 92. Id. at 271. 
 93. Id. at 292. 
 94. Id. at 304. 
 95. Id. at 338. 
 96. Id. at 70–71. 
 97. Id. at 74–75. 
 98. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954). 
 99. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 100. Id. at 438. 
 101. GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60:  
GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 10 (2014), https:// 
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-
60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8JNA-F4GR]. 
2004 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
1968,102 complicating Rosenberg’s claim that legislative reform was an 
essential spark to desegregation. 
Rosenberg also denied any substantial indirect effect of Brown on public 
opinion or movement activism.  He argued that although there was 
substantial elite support for desegregation prior to the Court’s 1954 
decision, the decision itself caused a retrogression of public support, 
especially among southern whites.103  However, in terms of the effect of 
Brown on the mobilization of movement actors, the evidence is mixed.  
Although Rosenberg suggests Brown did not contribute to mobilization, 
other scholars have noted the power of Brown in making segregation appear 
vulnerable, referencing King’s famous speech on the eve of the 
Montgomery bus boycott.104  In this regard, activist Bayard Rustin spoke 
directly to the relationship between Brown and the movement’s success: 
What made ’54 so unusual was that the Supreme Court in the Brown 
decision established black people as being citizens with all the rights of 
all other citizens.  Once that happened, then it was very easy for that 
militancy, which had been building up, to express itself in the 
Montgomery bus boycott of ’55–’56.105 
From a comparative institutional perspective, the question of how court 
decisions affect social change may be usefully reframed in comparison with 
parallel discussions within political science on the implementation of 
legislative statutes and administrative rules—i.e., policy enacted through 
the political branches and not the courts.  Echoing the research on court 
impact, an important early study noted that implementation depended on the 
qualities of the regulation (clarity and sanctions), regulators (degree of 
executive commitment and resources), and regulatees (cohesiveness, 
leadership, and levels of defiance).106  Looking at these factors, researchers 
concluded that policy reform produced mixed results in different contexts.  
Roger Hanson and Robert Crew found that reapportionment did not 
produce significant changes in state spending in central cities,107 while two 
separate studies found that federal employment policies were not 
implemented in Oakland, leading Eugene Bardach to issue this harsh 
indictment:  “[A]fter a policy mandate is agreed to, authorized, and adopted, 
there is underachievement of stated objectives, . . . delay, and excessive 
financial cost.”108  Joel Handler, in his pathbreaking work on welfare 
policy, emphasized how frontline administrative discretion of welfare 
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officers made policy implementation diverge from the intent of helping the 
poor.109  Overall, implementation research found that, although the political 
branches potentially had more levers to pressure compliance on the ground, 
such as the withdrawal of local funding, they nonetheless faced significant 
barriers to implementation in the face of local officials with decision-
making discretion. 
In addition to highlighting parallel enforcement programs across different 
lawmaking domains, a comparative institutional perspective also helps to 
reframe the broader critique of court-centered reform as co-opting and 
demobilizing social movements.  Again, the comparative institutional move 
is not to deny that this can occur but to point out how parallel co-optation 
and demobilization dynamics may happen in the wake of legislative 
success.  In this regard, the labor movement offers a counterstory of 
legislative victory followed by movement decline that is given less attention 
in critiques of legal liberalism.  In William Forbath’s historical account, it 
was precisely organized labor’s distrust of courts, sewed by judicial 
nullification of labor-backed redistributive policy and interference with 
collective action though antistrike injunctions, that shaped the labor 
movement’s voluntarist approach to government regulation.110  The 
movement first sought to protect the right to strike against judicial 
interference and then to protect labor’s freedom to collectively bargain 
through statutory codification and administrative enforcement.111  Yet the 
pathway of legislative reform, designed to disentangle organized labor from 
the courts, did not succeed over the long term in sustaining the movement, 
which has seen union density rates in the private sector fall dramatically—
undermined by a combination of corporate resistance, legal revision, and 
administrative co-optation.112 
2.  Backlash 
The critique of legal efficacy relates not only to the degree to which court 
decisions fail to work on the ground but also to how they may impose harm 
on social movements.  This concern is most prominent in discussions of 
backlash, which has become an important framework for assessing policy-
shifting court action.113 
 
 109. See Joel F. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 484–85 (1966). 
 110. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
16 (1991). 
 111. Id. at 163–65 (discussing passage of the Norris LaGuardia and Wagner Acts). 
 112. See generally Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002). 
 113. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Empirical Studies of Law and Social Change, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 171, 203 (discussing the Obama administration’s decision not to assert the 
broad constitutional right to marry in the Supreme Court litigation over California’s 
Proposition 8, barring same-sex marriage). 
2006 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Backlash is a concept with a long history,114 which achieved prominence 
in law with historian Michael Klarman’s analysis of Brown,115 followed by 
political scientist Gerald Rosenberg’s analysis of same-sex marriage 
litigation.116  The concept of backlash builds upon the political science 
literature on the relation between judicial decision making and public 
opinion.117  The basic question underlying backlash is whether rule change 
produces culture change or vice versa.  This question has direct 
implications for strategic advocacy decisions by lawyers.  If court decisions 
reflect but do not produce norm change, that counsels in favor of the tactical 
decision to build up support on the ground before turning to the court.  If 
court decisions do move public opinion, then lawyers may be wise to go to 
court before investing deeply in political mobilization.  In the real world, 
the prospective impact of court decisions is inherently uncertain and 
lawyers considering litigation to achieve policy reform must make complex 
judgments about how their judicial success might shape public attitudes 
about their cause—for better or for worse.  The comparative institutional 
perspective developed here adds an another strategic layer, which is that, in 
weighing the decision to litigate, advocates must also make predictions 
about the potential of nonlegal strategies to affect public opinion and 
produce backlash. 
The backlash thesis states that when a court decision is strongly out of 
line with a majority of the public’s view of an issue, the majority will resort 
to politics to counteract that court decision.118  The intensity of the backlash 
depends in part on the degree of variance between public opinion and the 
court’s opinion:  the greater the public opposition, the more vigorous the 
backlash.119  Lawyers assessing the prospective decision to litigate for 
policy change must therefore ask themselves whether public opposition to 
their position is so strong that winning in court risks mobilizing opposition 
in ways that could impair or even negate their victory.  The comparative 
institutional framework suggests, in addition, that lawyers must judge the 
costs of this potential judicial backlash relative to the anticipated costs of 
other routes of social movement action, including the costs of doing 
nothing. 
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A comparative framework is meant to spotlight a critical but widely 
overlooked point in the backlash literature, which is that the concept of 
judicial backlash implies that a nonjudicial path to a movement’s goal 
exists that would not produce backlash at all, or would produce backlash at 
a lower level of intensity.  Although it is impossible to ever prove or 
disprove this counterfactual, it is helpful to make it explicit in order to 
better judge the risks and rewards involved when lawyers have to make the 
strategic choice of whether to pursue impact litigation. 
This comparative analysis asks, in part, what the potential is for backlash 
to occur through legislative policy reform.  In this regard, there is some 
debate within the literature about the mechanics of backlash:  in particular, 
whether backlash is more likely to occur when a court makes a 
controversial decision of social policy instead of a legislature.120  The issue 
is whether backlash is related to what the public views as the relative 
institutional competence of courts and legislatures in making controversial 
social policy decisions, so that if a court makes such a decision, the 
backlash independently responds to the fact that it was a court decision, 
rather than the decision itself.121  William Eskridge suggests this in his 
analysis of Roe v. Wade,122 where he argues that the Court short-circuited 
politics and “declared a winner” on a divisive social issue.123  In his 
discussion of the movement for abortion rights, Gordon Silverstein makes a 
similar claim about the institutionally specific risks of court reform:  
“Unlike a political strategy in which it would have been necessary to 
change public opinion before embedding these protections in law, a judicial 
strategy allowed policy change without necessarily changing minds.”124  
Thus, “changes in judicial appointments could (and have) put these policy 
accomplishments at great risk.”125 
Klarman, in his most recent work on same-sex marriage, states that 
whether government action “derives from legislatures or courts seems 
relatively unimportant” in producing backlash.126  Supporting this view, a 
recent experimental study showed that whether a controversial legal change 
at odds with public opinion occurs via courts or legislatures does not 
significantly affect average attitudes about the underlying issues, although 
court decisions increase the intensity with which those attitudes are held.127 
The comparative institutional perspective focuses on how the judicial 
backlash thesis depends on the possibility of extralegal social movement 
alternatives to court action and suggests how directly engaging that 
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possibility may reframe how we assess lawyers’ tactical choices.  Doing so 
requires adopting the lawyer’s perspective at the moment of decision 
making in order to evaluate how the backlash calculus affects whether or 
when to turn to courts as a social change tool. 
Klarman’s view of backlash rests on the following observations.  The 
first is that court decisions may raise the public salience of issues in ways 
that force people and politicians to take a position that they may not have 
had to confront, often provoking a more negative reaction.128  Second, 
although there may be no difference in public reaction when courts or 
legislatures decide on issues at the same distance from public opinion, 
courts are more likely to make decisions at a larger variance and thus are 
more likely to be in the position of provoking backlash.129  Third, the 
intensity of the backlash is related to the intensity of support for and against 
the issue:  if decision opponents are more mobilized than supporters, the 
backlash will be worse.130  Both the second and third points relate to the 
nature and extent of the backlash that ensues.  When more people feel more 
strongly about the incorrectness of a court decision, they will go further to 
reverse it through political channels.  This is related to a fourth point, that 
controversial decisions provide vehicles for political parties to mobilize 
their constituents for overall political advantage.131 
Another set of backlash arguments relates not to the impact on decision 
opponents but on decision supporters.  Here, the idea is that controversial 
decisions that have a high public profile may reset a movement’s agenda in 
a way that diverts resources away from other important issues that may 
have otherwise had political traction.  In the marriage context, Klarman’s 
argument (before the events leading to Obergefell v. Hodges132) was that 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health133 moved the focus away from 
hate crime and antidiscrimination legislative advocacy in conservative 
states, and the momentum for more politically popular civil unions 
receded.134  A related argument is that controversial opinions undercut the 
ability of a movement’s political supporters to capitalize on opponents’ 
extreme positions on other issues.  Thus, if Democrats wanted to score 
political points because of the Republican Party’s extreme views opposing 
antidiscrimination laws for gays and lesbians, that became harder when the 
political focus shifted to marriage, an issue about which there was more 
political consensus across party lines.135 
One implication of the backlash analysis is that if there is a wide 
discrepancy between public opinion and what would be asked from a court, 
then lawyers should think hard about whether to proceed with the court 
challenge.  The difficult question is how to conduct that evaluation in a way 
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that fully considers the range of risks and rewards.  First, two obvious but 
important, observations are in order about lawyer decision making.  One is 
that there is a threshold calculation about whether a legal challenge will be 
successful on the merits.  Movement lawyers must have a degree of 
confidence, which is never 100 percent, that they have the precedent, 
arguments, and enough judicial allies to carry the legal day.  This is 
inherently uncertain, but one can make predictions based on past decision-
making records.  The point is that this is a separate calculation from the 
backlash one, which goes to the problems that may arise after achieving 
legal success. 
This leads to a second observation, which relates to how lawyers might 
think about the costs of winning.  In almost any situation in which a 
minority group deprived of rights seeks their validation through court, the 
minority does so in contravention of public opinion.  This means that the 
strategic choice for lawyers is either one of continued deprivation of the 
right or the pursuit of reform through court with backlash (because backlash 
is defined as a majority political response to a minority-advancing judicial 
decision).  In other words, one would expect that a dominant and hostile 
majority would respond to a court decision upholding minority rights by 
using the political machinery that the majority, by definition, already 
controls to reverse it.  And, indeed, we know from the historical record, 
dating back to Brown, that movement lawyers consider this possibility 
when they decide whether to proceed to court by asking:  Is the expected 
cost of backlash greater than the expected benefit of court victory, measured 
against the baseline of the continued deprivation of the right? 
From a lawyering perspective, this calculation can be broken down into 
related sets of questions.  First, what is the cost of maintaining the status 
quo of a continued rights violation?  One aspect of this question relates to 
how long the deprivation might last in the absence of legal challenge.  That 
is, if socioeconomic conditions and demographic trends are changing 
rapidly such that public attitudes are moving toward support for the 
minority position, movement lawyers might decide to wait given the 
potential downsides of legal action and the deeper change they might 
achieve through a legislative strategy built on growing public support.  This 
is one of the arguments against Roe:  that choice supporters were making 
progress at the state level and had this been left to play out, a more stable 
equilibrium could have been achieved.136  A state-by-state approach, 
however, raises a second dimension of the problem, which is the potential 
for geographic variation.  Although it may be true that a state-by-state 
approach embeds victories in politically sympathetic states and may not 
mobilize opposition in hostile states, the rights deprivation remains in those 
hostile states.  That is in fact what happened with respect to same-sex 
marriage before Obergefell.137  Thus, part of the legal equation is whether 
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substantial rights deprivation is tolerable, and for how long, and what the 
appropriate tipping point is at which the Court might weigh in favor of the 
right to “suppress outliers.”138  This is an extremely difficult question but 
one that will always inform a movement lawyer’s choice. 
Even if continued rights deprivation would be intolerable, that does not 
answer the question of whether to assert a legal challenge, because success 
could reinforce the status quo or make conditions worse.  Thus, a second 
question is whether backlash makes the challenger group worse off than it 
otherwise would have been without litigation.  That was Rosenberg’s 
position on marriage prior to the campaign that culminated in Obergefell:  
that because Baehr v. Lewin139 and Goodridge sparked constitutional 
amendments in twenty-seven states and statutory amendments in others, it 
set the movement back below the starting point by making it harder to 
achieve the goal of marriage.140  How should lawyers think about the risk 
that social reform litigation “may set their cause back”?141 
First, and more narrowly, it would not seem like the passage of a statute 
in a state where there is de facto denial of a right is a significant setback 
because the right would have to be asserted via legislative process or court 
opinion in any event.  What about the constitutional amendments?  These 
were in states where the opposition to marriage was so deep that it seems 
implausible that the politics would have changed within a reasonable time 
frame.  In such a context, how harmful a state constitutional amendment is 
to the ultimate realization of a movement goal is partly a function of how 
difficult the amendment would be to rescind.  Some states, for example, 
permit constitutional amendments via majority vote on ballot initiatives.  In 
those states, the achievement of majority public support for a movement’s 
goal would permit the movement to reamend the constitution to codify that 
goal.  Although this would certainly involve significant investments of time 
and money, it is not clear how much more costly it would be than codifying 
the promovement goal in a deeply hostile state through alternative means. 
A deeper problem for movement proponents is that moving too quickly 
may not only cause a counterreaction in the form of new legal barriers to 
goal achievement, it may also move further away from the goal by causing 
public support to deteriorate.  A court decision resulting in a constitutional 
amendment foreclosing the right is bad for movement proponents on its 
own terms.  It is worse if it also causes more people to be opposed to the 
right since that would make it harder to reverse the legal damage done by 
the amendment itself.  So if the ultimate pathway to reform is through 
shifting culture, then that goal moves further away.  However, it is difficult 
to predict in advance if a legal decision will have a negative or positive 
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effect on public opinion.  For instance, in California, there was no evidence 
that opposition to marriage increased because of the California Supreme 
Court’s assertion of a constitutional right to marry in 2008.142  Or consider 
Loving v. Virginia,143 which was followed by a decrease in public support 
for antimiscegenation laws although opposition to interracial marriage was 
as high in the mid-1960s as opposition to same-sex marriage was in the 
early 1990s before the Baehr decision in Hawaii.144 
Two further points are in order.  From an ex ante perspective, even if one 
accepted that there were costs of pursuing legal redress through courts and 
that the movement could end up in a worse position by doing so, that would 
not end the analysis.  For one, there is the uncertainty point.  One would 
want to calculate the probability that certain harms would occur.  In the 
event that there was a significant possibility that they would not, a court 
challenge might be worth pursuing given the intolerable nature of the status 
quo. 
The comparative institutional point is that even if one was confident of 
negative consequences flowing from a court strategy, those consequences 
would have to be compared against the consequences of viable movement 
alternatives.  As already suggested, there is always the alternative of 
waiting, but for those in the movement who either suffer or identify with 
the harm, the cost of waiting is likely to be intolerably high. 
The backlash thesis does not typically presume that the alternative to 
court action is doing nothing.  Rather, the argument is that a political 
strategy is available and would be more effective at building public support 
over time in ways that bring about more sustainable change.  However, here 
too, the picture is more complicated precisely because court decisions are 
not the only opportunities for political entrepreneurs to mobilize opposition.  
As has been the case with President Obama’s legislative achievements, like 
Obamacare, and executive action, like the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program, nonlegal successes can also be used to stoke political 
opposition.145  And even a state-by-state political approach may ultimately 
build to the point that it becomes a wedge issue that might be used to 
galvanize opposition.  Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel’s analysis of the 
history of Roe demonstrates this dynamic by showing how political 
entrepreneurs within the Republican Party were already working with the 
Catholic Church to mobilize religiously conservative voters against 
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abortion as part of the party’s “Southern Strategy” before the Court’s 
decision.146  Particularly in a post-Trump era in which hyperpartisanship 
and the pervasiveness of media spin have made it easier to use information 
to motivate political attacks, one can foresee legislative victories also 
posing backlash risk.  Whether the risk is greater or less than that incurred 
by a decisive Supreme Court decision is again a complex and uncertain 
question.  The point here is to underscore that developing better theoretical 
and empirical frameworks to answer the question is critically important to 
charting prospective mobilization and judging its outcome. 
In this regard, some scholars have recently sought to focus attention on 
how strategic lawyer decision making intersects with the potential for 
backlash.  David Schraub’s analysis of when legal arguments or decisions 
may produce “sticky slopes” that injure a movement is an important case in 
point.147  In Schraub’s view, a sticky slope occurs when the achievement of 
policy success A at time one acts to block further reform B at time two.148  
This possibility has strategic implications, as “the specter of the sticky slope 
may counsel opposing, delaying, or modifying the demand for A, on the 
grounds that it will pose a later barrier to B.”149  One of Schraub’s examples 
of a “simple” sticky slope is the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,150 which he suggests may have mobilized more people to 
oppose “its extension to abortion rights in Roe v. Wade.”151  He also 
identifies as a sticky slope a legal success that demobilizes a movement, 
“dissipating its momentum and rendering it vulnerable to counterattack.”152  
In his analysis of “wrong argument” sticky slopes, he traces how particular 
legal frames, like “colorblindness,” which appear compelling at the time 
they are presented (as in Brown), may later turn against the movement as 
they feed too easily into arguments by movement opponents, as he suggests 
was the case in the Court’s use of colorblindness to strike down a Seattle 
school district’s voluntary desegregation plan in Parents Involved v. Seattle 
School District No. 1.153  In Schraub’s terms, “Early reformist rhetoric and 
argumentation often sets the tone for the entire course of the movement, and 
if it is not chosen carefully a social movement can get stuck due to initial 
missteps.”154  Moreover, arguments that push too hard, instead of nudging 
norm change, can produce noncompliance or undermine confidence in law, 
which can have a negative impact on long-term social movement goals.155 
Although Schraub’s conception of sticky slopes is theoretically 
compelling and empirically plausible, it raises problems that are also 
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apparent in the backlash literature.  First, although Schraub resists the 
backlash frame and does extend his analysis to all types of movement 
policy gains, his main focus is on the sticky slope potential of court 
decisions.  As discussed above, although court-induced stickiness is an 
important strategic consideration for lawyers and activists contemplating a 
court-centered reform strategy, it is only part of the analysis because one 
must also contemplate the consequences of alternative strategies, as well as 
of inaction, which itself may become “sticky” by suggesting acquiescence 
to the status quo.  As social movement theorists emphasize, any type of 
political success can dampen movement mobilization,156 while issue 
framing may tend toward more mainstream normative concepts in order to 
have the broadest resonance,157 a move that also makes them particularly 
susceptible to later revision.  Finally, even if it is true that some types of 
legal strategies and arguments may produce sticky slopes that have long-
term movement costs, those costs must be weighed against the likelihood 
that other strategies would have produced better results.  The indeterminacy 
of doctrine makes it hard to imagine how movement opponents bent on 
undoing old gains could not find some rhetorical basis in original 
movement arguments to do so.  Would black students have been better off 
in the long term if the Brown Court had mandated equalization, rather than 
desegregation, as Bell has suggested?158  Would they be better off if the 
Court had not weighed in at all and activists had sought local political 
solutions instead? 
Changes in the media have also affected the way advocates think about 
court-based strategies in relation to backlash.  It seems plausible that in the 
1950s and 1960s, public opinion of the Supreme Court was such that many 
people viewed it as a neutral body above politics.  In this context, it may 
have been the case that by overtly wading into politics in Brown and 
subsequent high-profile cases on deeply contested issues of social policy, 
the Court lost its veneer of neutrality in a way that provoked strongly 
negative public reactions. 
However, times have changed so that popular opinion of the Court may 
hinge less on its neutrality.  The structure of political contention is highly 
developed, and media culture is profoundly different than it was at the time 
of Brown, when the conduit of information transmission was through major 
periodicals or the canonical nightly television news.159  Now, in contrast, 
opinion is deeply influenced by a range of new media actors, vying for 
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attention in the hyperpartisan and more decentralized 24/7 news cycle.160  
This means it is no longer simply the case that the public will react to court 
decisions based on a preexisting narrative frame about judicial competence 
but that public reaction will be shaped by competing narratives crafted by 
partisans and often disseminated through social media feeds that target a 
selected audience.  Proponents of court decisions will therefore need to get 
their message out to combat negative messaging from the other side.  How 
this competition plays out is not completely certain; the only certainty is 
that it will occur and that advocates must have a public relations plan to 
complement their litigation plan.  In assessing backlash threat in this new 
environment, comparative institutional analysis must therefore assess a 
broader range of factors related to opinion formation and change. 
In the end, the risk of court-specific backlash analysis is that it may 
present an incomplete cost-benefit calculation that shapes a negative 
assessment of legal interventions in ways that have the effect of counseling 
in favor of a politics of lawyer circumspection.  In this critical vision, by 
framing the issue as backlash, what may at bottom be dynamics that 
systematically disadvantage challenges by less powerful social groups are 
converted into justifications for blaming lawyers for the results of their 
challenges.  The frame of backlash suggests something wrong with the 
strategic choice as opposed to the underlying opposition in the first 
instance.  Movements are thus in a double bind:  locked into subordination 
until enlightened views ultimately prevail or blamed for the hostility 
engendered should they have the temerity to challenge the status quo. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to reframe the foundational critiques of lawyers 
in social movements by holding up the mirror of critical scholarly 
commentary on their nonlegal counterparts.  The goal of this exercise has 
been to spotlight important similarities in the problems scholars identify 
across the domains of legal and nonlegal mobilization for social change.  
Overall, comparative institutional analysis draws attention to how risks of 
legal action may be overstated by the tendency to conflate negative 
campaign outcomes resulting from political disadvantage with negative 
campaign outcomes resulting from the use of legal strategies.  Because it is 
generally not possible to know whether a particular bad legal outcome is 
worse than hypothetical alternatives (either waiting or advancing change 
through nonlegal channels), scholars may misidentify weaknesses in social 
movement politics as defects in reform-oriented lawyering.  Similarly, the 
rewards of movement-led change may be overstated because of a tendency 
to extrapolate historical lessons from different epochs and political contexts 
to the present era, in which progressive movements face distinct constraints. 
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Reframing the foundational critiques of lawyers through the lens of this 
comparative institutional perspective yields two important insights.  First, 
reframing suggests that scholarly discomfort with lawyer participation in 
social movements may express less of a professional critique than a 
political one, reflecting deeper concerns about the movement costs of elite 
representation and the pursuit of institutional politics.  From this vantage 
point, accountability concerns are not intrinsically about the 
representational problems of the lawyer-client relationship but rather about 
the political tradeoffs of elite representation of different elements of 
contested social movement constituencies.  Efficacy is not just a debate 
about litigation and courts but reflects political disagreements over the 
utility of elite intermediation, incremental reform, and the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions.  Second, broadening the theoretical perspective to 
encompass the challenges faced by nonlawyers in social movements may 
rehabilitate the role of their lawyer counterparts—revealing lawyers as less 
suspect allies in outsider challenges to power and pointing toward a more 
optimistic account in which lawyers act as partners, and sometimes even 
leaders, in struggles for transformative democratic change. 
